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Abstract: 
As recently stakeholders complain about the use of conflict minerals in consumer products that 
are often invisible to them in final products, firms across industries implement conflict mineral 
management practices. Conflict minerals are those, whose systemic exploitation and trade 
contribute to human right violations in the country of extraction and surrounding areas. 
Particularly supply chain managers in the Western world are challenged taking reasonable steps 
to identify and prevent risks associated with these resources due to the globally dispersed nature 
of supply chains and the opacity of the origin of commodities. Supply chain due diligence 
(SCDD) represents a holistic concept to proactively manage supply chains reducing the 
likelihood of the use of conflict minerals effectively. Based on an exploratory study with 27 
semi-structured interviews within five European industries we provide insights into patterns of 
implementation, key motivational factors, barriers and enablers, and impacts of SCDD in 
mineral supply chains. Our results contribute to both theory and practice as we provide first 
insights to SCDD practices and make recommendations for an industry-wide implementation 
of SCDD. Altogether, this study provides the basis for future theory testing research in the 
context of SCDD and conflict mineral management. 
1. Introduction 
Human rights violations and social problems are highly prevalent in business practices despite 
the success story of corporate social responsibility (CSR)1 in the last two decades (Arnold, 
2010). In fact, social conflicts and human rights abuses caused by companies are rather rule 
than exception and thus, the United Nations’ Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises (2014, p. 3) recently reported to the 
General Assembly an urgent need “[…] to strengthen legal and policy frameworks to prevent 
and protect against human rights abuses by business enterprises”.  
                                                          
We would like to sincerely thank the two anonymous reviewers for their constructive feedback that 
helped us to improve the manuscript significantly. 
1 Although the term is often used as a synonym and sometimes also as an umbrella term for many 
related concepts such as business ethics, corporate accountability, corporate citizenship, corporate 
sustainability, etc. (cp. Scherer and Palazzo, 2011), in line with McWilliams and Siegel (2001, p. 117), 
we define CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm 
and that which is required by law”. “Social good” in this context does include ethical and 
environmental issues, too. Moreover, we will follow the extended notion of CSR, “political CSR”, as 
discussed within the background section. For a detailed overview of CSR definitions see Dahlsrud 
(2008). 
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Due to increasing business process outsourcing and globally dispersed production facilities, 
social problems and human rights violations are no longer only intraorganizationally rooted, 
but also often occur in companies’ supply chains (Grimm et al., 2011), which makes them a 
complex and vital challenge for supply chain managers as the example of Apple has shown. In 
2012 Apple admitted a human rights problem within its supply chains and a failure of its 
supplier monitoring system (Foley, 2012), best illustrated by its key supplier Foxconn that 
turned out to be a constant source of tremor due to questionable labor conditions (e.g., Duhigg 
and Barboza, 2012; Xu and Li, 2013).  
Besides the negative effects of conflict minerals on those that are directly affected by it, 
human rights violations also bear an enormous reputational risk for companies allegedly 
associated with conflict minerals. Key stakeholders (e.g., consumers, mass media, employees) 
expect companies to behave responsibly (Parmar et al., 2010) and have become intolerant of 
those not fulfilling their human rights expectations (Dawkins and Lewis, 2003). Consequently, 
firms that are located downstream in the supply chain and that are more visible to stakeholders 
are particularly threatened by social supply chain problems.  
New frameworks and regulations such as the UK Bribery Act, the recent UK Modern Slavery 
Act, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, the above mentioned UN Guiding 
Principles for Business & Human Rights, or the Brazilian National Pact for the Eradication of 
Slave Labour strive to eliminate opacity in global supply chains by advocating a proactive and 
multi-tier logic (Sedex, 2013). Simultaneously, companies are more and more beginning to 
understand the importance of managing indirect (sub-)suppliers as many financial, operational, 
and sustainable problems lie beyond the closest tier levels of suppliers (Tachizawa and Wong, 
2014).  
The recent debate among practitioners and scholars concerning the topic of so-called conflict 
minerals or 3TG – tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold from conflict areas such as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) Region – illustrates the importance of social and human rights issues 
in management practice as well as the emerging need to react to social conflicts. Conflict 
minerals are those, whose systematic exploitation and trade in a context of conflict contribute 
to, benefit from or result in the commission of serious violations of human rights, violations of 
international humanitarian law or violations amounting to crimes under international law 
(Global Witness, 2014). Being a scourge for a whole region, conflict minerals do not only 
involve child and slave labor, but also generate considerable funds for armed groups (Gold et 
al., 2015). Thus, they contribute to the continuation or outbreak of violent conflict and 
undermine national endeavors towards development, good governance, and the rule of law. In 
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this regard, conflict minerals are similar to “blood diamonds” that have widely attracted media 
attention in the 1990s and 2000s. Conflict minerals, however, are processed in many different 
components throughout various industries and hence have a high overall impact on business 
(Rotter et al. 2014). 
In recent attempts to cope with conflict minerals, both international and national initiatives 
like the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) or 
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-
Affected and High-Risk Areas (OECD Guidance) demand supply chain managers to verify 
purchased goods as “conflict-free” or to implement measures in order to better manage these 
problems. As a reaction firms have begun to apply several governance mechanisms to avoid 
adverse effects of conflict mineral sourcing. For instance, based on the Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC) code of conduct many firms in the consumer electronics industry 
have published conflict mineral statements either separately on their web page or within their 
own (supplier) code of conduct. Exemplarily, LG requires its suppliers to “evaluate the origin 
or source of their materials throughout their supply chains to verify that they have not been 
obtained through any illegal form of mining (e.g., materials obtained from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo)” (LG, 2013).  
However, the mere transfer of responsibilities upstream the supply chain apparently will not 
stop the trade with conflict minerals, notably due to two reasons: On the one hand, globalization 
has created governance gaps in a sense that companies are able to abuse human rights without 
being sanctioned by independent third parties (Ruggie, 2008; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). This 
gap results in a non-allocation of responsibility that makes the problem of human rights abuses 
and social conflicts within dispersed supply chains very likely to endure, particularly without 
collaborative approaches to remedy these deficiencies (Rotter et al., 2014). On the other hand, 
conflict minerals usually originate from globally diverse deposits and are difficult to track 
within components and manufactured products. This is the case because these minerals are 
mostly mixed with minerals of different origin and added to metal alloys. Consequently, 
although the share of these minerals in single end products is negligible, they are prevalent in 
numerous products and commodities.  
Together, these circumstances leave downstream firms nearly incapable of detecting risks 
associated with conflict minerals. Hence, the topic of conflict minerals becomes one of supply 
chain management rather than of individual companies’ legal or compliance divisions alone. 
What is needed is effective and supply chain wide mechanisms of traceability and due diligence 
that allow firms to take individual and collective responsibility as parts of supply chains. As 
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Ruggie (2008, p. 17) states: “To discharge the responsibility to respect [human rights] requires 
due diligence. This concept describes the steps a company must take to become aware of, 
prevent and address adverse human rights impacts.”  
In the context of mineral supply chains, due diligence represents a holistic concept that aims 
at providing a chain of custody tracking from mine to export at country level, regional tracking 
of mineral flows through the creation of a database on their purchases, independent audits on 
all actors in the supply chain, and a monitoring of the whole mineral chain by a mineral chain 
auditor (Bleischwitz et al., 2012). In this sense, due diligence transcends conventional risk 
management approaches that usually focus on the prevention of direct impacts on the core 
business activities of companies. Moreover, due diligence focuses on a maximum of 
transparency as an end itself while risk management is always directed towards the end of 
averting direct damages. However, besides the Dodd-Frank Act and the OECD Guidance, there 
is still a gap in due diligence practices as international norms are just emerging (Sarfaty, 2015). 
Our research is exploratory in nature and aims at finding first patterns of supply chain due 
diligence (SCDD) implementation in practice. Furthermore, we expect specific enablers and 
barriers for SCDD to be in place that differ within particular firms and industries. The novelty 
of the concept and its emerging significance for all kind of industries lead to the question, what 
kind of effects and consequences SCDD might have for companies once it is implemented.  
By following these paths of research, we state recommendations for an industry-wide 
implementation of SCDD, explore the new concept, and provide the basis for future theory 
testing research. Accordingly, our research questions are the following:  
(1) Which patterns of SCDD implementation do exist in practice?  
(2) What are enablers and barriers of SCDD implementation?  
(3) What is the expected impact of SCDD? 
To answer these questions, we conducted 27 semi-structured exploratory interviews with 
European firms from five different industries, most prevalent for the use of conflict minerals 
such as 3TG: aerospace and defense, technical hardware, jewelry, automotive, and electronics. 
Thus, our study includes a cross-sectional multi-tier approach including Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs), typical first tier suppliers (component manufacturers), and second- to 
third-tier suppliers (metal traders, metal processors, and refineries) (cp. Figure 1).  
**** Please insert Figure 1 about here **** 
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The remainder of the article is structured as follows: After providing a profound background 
on social conflicts inherent in mineral supply chains together with approaches to manage these 
in section two, we introduce our implementation framework in section three. The subsequent 
section describes the applied methods followed by the results of our analysis in section five. 
After a discussion of the findings with managerial implications and an outlook on avenues for 
further research in the sixth section, the last section concludes this article. 
2. Background 
While the emergence of concepts such as CSR and in particular sustainability was accompanied 
by a research focus on the environmental impacts of supply chain management, more recently 
the discussion about social issues in supply chains has gained a new quality and made it as a 
top priority among NGOs, the media and ultimately, customers (Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).  
In particular, the classical CSR concept, understood as “taking actions that appear to further 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” 
(McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, p. 117) is incrementally extended by stakeholders towards a 
responsibility of firms for wrongdoings that hardly fall into their direct sphere of influence 
(Amaeshi et al., 2008) leading to new concepts, such as political CSR (Scherer and Palazzo, 
2006; 2007; 2011).  
Political CSR has gained attention particularly due to the work of Matten and Crane (2005) 
as well as Scherer and Palazzo (2007; 2011) and the literature has been increasingly expanded 
since (e.g., Crane et al., 2008; Mäkinen and Kourula, 2012; Rotter et al., 2014; Whelan, 2012). 
In its essence, political CSR differs from traditional CSR aspects in its demand to transcend not 
only the initial role of businesses that seeks besides profit maximization also to further social 
goods but also to fill gaps that resulted from eroding international and national regulations 
caused by globalization (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). From this perspective, companies, in 
particular internationally acting ones with global supply chains, have begun to take on state-
like roles in order to partially fill the gap left behind by failed states and missing supra- and 
international regulative frameworks (Matten and Crane, 2005). Consequently, firms are 
increasingly required to track and manage sources for social conflicts in their supply chains, 
particularly upstream. As background for our study, the following paragraph summarizes 
important literature on social problems in supply chains and passes on to a detailed perspective 
on how these issues contextualize in mineral supply chains. Subsequently, the applicability of 
established supply chain governance mechanisms is depicted, closing with a reflection on the 
SCDD concept. 
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2.1. Social problems in supply chains 
Multinational corporations operating in developing countries are particularly prone to social 
risks due to a lack of national regulation in developing countries and efficient firm initiatives 
to ensure a basic level of safety and decent working conditions (Locke, 2013). As a result, social 
problems linked to human rights abuses (e.g., forced and child labor, excessive working hours, 
discrimination) and omissions in providing safe and healthy working conditions (limited or no 
access to fresh water, no fire protection, missing emergency exits, etc.) remain structural 
problems within various industries. Besides conflict minerals, among the most prominent and 
upsetting examples are unsafe working conditions in the textile industry (e.g., the Ali garment 
factory fire in Karachi, Pakistan where more than 300 factory workers died in 2012 due to 
locked doors and windows) or incidents of forced and child labor in the food and crop industry 
(exemplified by West-African cocoa and coffee producers, Thai prawn-trawlers, Kazakh 
tobacco plantations, or Uzbek cotton fields (Bhat, 2013; Griffin, 2014; Kramer, 2010; Manzo, 
2005).  
Furthermore, industries extracting natural resources such as oil, gas, metals, and minerals 
are regularly shattered by events related to labor accidents and human rights abuses (Silva and 
Jacinto, 2012). Upcoming with the topic of blood diamonds, for the first time the Western public 
had conceived a direct link between their own consumption behavior and the promotion of 
social problems in conflict-laden countries. In the blink of an eye it became clear that Western 
luxury in terms of jewelry and particularly diamonds comes at the cost of developing countries 
suffering from long-lasting civil wars; ironically often directly caused by Western colonization. 
Not least this increased attention for social problems led to the emergence of celebrated 
initiatives such as the Kimberley-Process which attempted to generate a certification scheme 
and to foster transparency in the process of diamond extraction. However, the image of this 
initiative had rapidly crumbled as it constantly refused to address the clear links between 
diamonds, violence, and tyranny in Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire, and Venezuela (Garrett and 
Lintzer, 2010; Panikkar and Brugge, 2007; Rhode, 2014; Global Witness, 2011). As a result, 
issues of blood diamonds are still prevalent today (Perry, 2012). 
Recently, conflict minerals receive more attention in theory and practice due to the 
unintended consequences they cause at the origin of supply chains. For example, in DRC and 
the adjacent area, despite the end of the civil war in 2002, in 2008 it was estimated that still 
45,000 people were dying every month and that the finances of conflict minerals and the fight 
for these resources were a central driver for this.  As Sullivan and Atama (2010, p. 1) suggest: 
“With only a few guns and shovels, local warlords can establish themselves as a group that 
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must be reckoned with, financing their own growth into a militia powerful enough to demand 
a seat at the table in negotiations and eventually a position in the army–from where they can 
continue to profit from the minerals trade.” These armed groups control 12 of the 13 major 
mines in DRC (BSR, 2010) and received significant funds not only by direct control over these 
mines, but also by taxing transport and trade combined with paying poor wages, or employing 
children as miners (for a detailed description see Epstein and Yuthas, 2011). Overall, armed 
groups receive 90 percent of the profits from conflict minerals whereas workers receive very 
limited pay (Prendergast & Lezhnev, 2009). It is also important to note that financial resources 
attract genocidaires like the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) which 
receives their major income from these sources. Moreover, these groups initiate not only gun 
conflict, rape, and slavery, but it is also obvious that central governments in these countries are 
not able to terminate these conflicts as their military is also often involved in these mafia-like 
structures illustrating a looming gap in governance. 
2.2. Conflict minerals as a catalyst for social problems in supply chains 
In the case of conflict mineral supply chains, most social problems are settled around raw 
material extracting activities within the sourcing country (cp. Figure 1). Due to specific 
geological conditions – deposits of tin, tantalum, and tungsten are often too small to be 
amendable by large-scale industrial enterprises – mining within conflict and high risk regions 
is mainly pursued as artisanal and small scale mining (ASM) (Garrett and Lintzer, 2010).  
However, ASM poses many problems for those people pursuing it. In general, governments 
of conflict areas do not recognize the legality of ASM. Thus, small scale miners are operating 
illegally, or at best in a legal grey area, which leaves them without any governmental protection 
and thus open to exploitation by armed groups (BSR, 2010).  
Aside from these legality problems, small scale miners suffer from missing health and safety 
standards and financial drawbacks. The majority of workers subsists on less than $5 per day, 
which often locks them in debt to local traders and strongmen (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009). 
Moreover, small scale miners are forced to buy an annual digger card from extra-governmental 
authorities, charging $25 which many cannot afford (Bleischwitz et al., 2012).  
ASM is highly work intensive and increasingly attracts low-skilled urban families. Thus, 
children are usually part of the ASM workforce (André and Godin, 2014). In most instances, 
ASM is controlled by armed groups that seek benefits from trading conflict minerals. Once such 
groups control a mine, they put workers under extortion and physical harm (Kristof, 2010). 
Hence, profits from conflict minerals skimmed by armed groups are not contributing to 
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improved living standards within the sourcing regions (i.e., better schools and health care) but 
contrarily impair these (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009).  
Finally, subsequent export related activities are susceptible to social problems as well: Large 
parts of transportation to and within neighboring countries of conflict areas are controlled by 
armed groups which usually require payments either in taxes or mineral shares (OECD, 2013). 
Local consolidators and exporters are often paid in advance by international traders. Thus, 
although it is fairly easy to determine the origin of the minerals at this stage (and to avoid 
sourcing from conflict regions and mines),  these exporters and consolidators do not require 
proof of origin but rely only on verbal checks instead (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009). This 
allows traders in surrounding countries to buy conflict minerals and to mix them with legally 
exported and produced minerals (Epstein and Yuthas, 2011). The fact that most of these traders 
rely on the protection of officers in security services (police or military) with which they keep 
close ties even intensifies this flawed process; thereby establishing a climate of repression and 
real threat of violence.  
When it comes to tracing conflict minerals in supply chains back to their sources, the starting 
point of the metal supply chain (mostly smelters) is mainly cited as the critical link to do so 
(Young et al., 2010). Once the mineral ore is refined into metal it becomes impossible to 
distinguish material with and without conflict minerals. Indeed, adequate records of mineral 
origin are rarely kept or passed to new owners (Prendergast and Lezhnev, 2009; Rotter et al., 
2014). In subsequent downstream stages, the minerals are refined and the metal is used to create 
components such as capacitors (tantalum), solder (tin), specialty metals (tungsten), or jewelry 
(gold). Afterwards, product manufacturers or original design manufacturers use these 
components to assemble compound products (e.g., hard drives, semiconductors, or screens) 
which are then finally assembled by OEMs or product companies and sold to end customers. 
Yet, particularly along these latter steps, social problems caused by conflict minerals rarely 
occur.  
2.3. Managing social problems in minerals supply chains 
Firms apply many different measures and processes in order to gather and share relevant 
information on social problems within their supply chains. The main goal of all these different 
processes is to increase transparency and to gain as much knowledge as possible about suppliers 
and the circumstances under which particular goods and services are produced. Yet, as there 
are many different partners involved in globally dispersed multi-tier supply chains, OEMs and 
other large downstream firms face enormous difficulties in collecting the required information 
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(Epstein and Yuthas, 2011). Lower suppliers often either do not have the information available 
or are reluctant to share it as they fear competitive drawbacks. 
Although the management of social problems in mineral supply chains is a matter of supply 
chain risk management in a broader sense, some important differences need consideration. 
Firms try to achieve conflict-free mineral supply chains from a very early stage on by focusing 
mainly on practices that focus on collecting relevant information about lower suppliers. Yet, 
this risk identification phase is only one component in risk management approaches besides 
risk analysis, risk evaluation, and risk treatment (ISO 31000, 2009). The common 
understanding of supply chain risk management deviates even more, as its main purpose is to 
build and maintain resilient supply chains and first and foremost to prevent supply disruptions 
(Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005), which is not the primary goal in the context of managing mineral 
supply chains with regard to social problems. 
Hence, the potential set of measures for the management of social problems in mineral 
supply chains is diminished down to few viable processes linked to risk identification that are 
prevalent among firms: certification schemes, chains of custody, traceability, and due diligence 
processes (Bouslah et al., 2010; Doorey, 2011; Epstein and Yuthas, 2011; Fasterling and 
Demuijnck, 2013; Jaffee, 2010; Morali and Searcy, 2013). Table 1 provides an overview of 
these concepts and illustrates their main features for risk identification. 
**** Please insert Table 1 about here **** 
Due diligence originally describes a versatile investigation and inspection of the financial 
operations of a company and is usually applied prior to mergers and acquisitions (Sinkin and 
Putney, 2014). Yet, more and more the concept is also applied to implement regulatory 
frameworks, such as, the UNHCR Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013) or the Dodd-Frank Act. The latter is particularly important 
in the context of SCDD as it sets a new landmark: The Dodd-Frank Act provides an obligation 
for firms that file reports with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
screen their extended supply chains for conflict minerals. Roughly at the same time as the Dodd-
Frank Act, a collaborative, government-backed, multi-stakeholder initiative was developed: the 
OECD Guidance. Both, OECD Guidance and the Dodd-Frank Act aim to “provide a chain of 
custody tracking from mine to export at country level, regional tracking of mineral flows 
through the creation of a database on their purchases, independent audits on all actors in the 
supply chain and a monitoring of the whole mineral chain by a Mineral Chain Auditor” 
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(Bleischwitz et al., 2012, p. 27). However, these two initiatives differ with regard to the 
expected outcome: While the Dodd-Frank Act requires corporations to be conflict-free in terms 
of their products, the main purpose of the OECD Guidance is to provide comprehensive 
recommendations for companies so that they thoroughly respect human rights when sourcing 
minerals or metals (OECD, 2013) 
Hence, the OECD Guidance is mostly based on the logic of SCDD processes and 
recommends the following five process steps to firms: (1) Establishment of strong company 
management systems, (2) identification and assessment of supply chain risk, (3) design and 
implementation of a strategy to respond to risk, (4) carrying out independent third-party audits 
of SCDD, and (5) reporting on SCDD (OECD, 2013). When following these broad advises, 
firms are supposed to increase the overall transparency along their supply chains from raw 
material extraction over refinement and component production until the end consumer. In this 
sense, SCDD enables the trace-back of conflict minerals until their origin and represents a 
promising approach in light of interconnected social conflicts and actors in minerals supply 
chains.  
In the following section, we investigate the theoretical processes of implementing SCDD, 
thereby building the foundation of our empirical investigation. 
3. Theoretical framework of SCDD implementation 
In order to clarify aspects of how SCDD processes are implemented within organizations, we 
base our study on the original research model of Litz (1996) and adapt it according to our field 
of interest and towards a more dynamic perspective (cp. Figure 2). This model is a means to 
ground our research in literature, to guide and focus our investigation, and to base our findings 
on theory. Opposed to purely grounded research we build our study on this framework as well 
as on further related literature. 
The CSR topics under scrutiny (i.e., conflict minerals regulations and SCDD processes) are 
just recently emerging and have already attracted high public and scholarly attention. Yet, 
despite the vast general recognition of CSR within business practice, it has still not been 
investigated – neither empirically nor theoretically – which implementation mechanisms 
support the corporate success of CSR implementation (Lindgreen and Swaen, 2010). Thus, only 
few studies focused on the dynamic and practical aspects of the process of installing CSR within 
organizations (e.g., Dobele et al., 2014; Lindgreen et al., 2009), which explicitly calls for more 
research to close this gap. In this context, Litz’ (1996) framework suits our research interests 
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particularly well as it allows us to conceptually structure our explanatory and inductively 
conducted study. 
**** Please insert Figure 2 about here **** 
Based on a critique of the resource based view of the firm (RBV) Litz (1996, p. 1355) 
highlighted the need to extend RBV in terms of CSR aspects due to a “commensurate lack of 
attention dedicated to conceptualizing the resource-worthiness of a corporation’s social and 
ethical response capabilities”. In its initial form, RBV has claimed that organizational 
performance is mainly shaped and influenced by an organization’s individual resources and 
capabilities which can be assets, information and knowledge, human capital, firm attributes, 
and so on (Barney, 1991). However, Litz (1996) and others (e.g., McWilliams and Siegel, 2001) 
emphasized the need to incorporate CSR capabilities (i.e., “to perceive, assess, and respond to 
the social and ethical dimensions of daily corporate life” (Litz, 1996, p.1355)) as these can also 
render competitive advantage for firms. 
Hence, referring to Kuhn’s (1963; 1974) original three stage model of companies’ adaptive 
behavior, Litz (1996) integrated insights from CSR literature into an enriched three stage model 
of adaptive behavior. This model states three specific stages which organizations undergo if 
they are to adequately react to social and ethical issues within their daily corporate environment: 
(1) the phase of perceiving a stimulus; (2) the phase of deliberation; and (3) performance 
outcomes (Litz, 1996).  
Yet, as CSR illustrates a dynamic business environment, resulting in constantly changing 
competitive and regulative frameworks and continuously altered stakeholder expectations – the 
emergence of conflict minerals serves as a distinguished example of this – we follow Reuter et 
al. (2010) in their assessment to interpret Litz (1996) in terms of dynamic capabilities in place 
of RBV. Dynamic capabilities are a “firm’s capacity to integrate, build and reconfigure internal 
and external resources using organizational processes to respond to changes in the competitive 
environment and to design new value creating strategies” (Reuter et al., 2010, p. 48).  
As the expected OECD Guidance generates a first general awareness for the conflict mineral 
topic among many European firms that are not subject to the Dodd-Frank Act, we intentionally 
used the model of adaptive behavior to find the reasons “why” and “how” the OECD Guidance 
are implemented within participating organizations and “what” particularly outcomes they 
either expect or already have realized. 
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Hence, in order to frame the study accurately, in the following we will explain each of these 
three stages in more detail by transferring them to our specific context.  
(1) Stimuli perception: We assume that companies require a perception of certain stimuli in 
order to consider the OECD Guidance and SCDD processes to become part of their corporate 
behavior. Whelan (2012) emphasizes the need for more clarity in the range of companies’ 
motivations for decision-making in CSR. With its voluntary character, the OECD Guidance 
leaves its implementation open to firms. Yet, as previous studies have shown different 
motivations and lines of argumentation exist for firms to follow new guidelines or not (e.g., 
Logsdon and Wood, 2005; Schleper and Busse, 2013; Short and Toffel, 2010; Wright and 
Rwabizambuga, 2005). Getting a better grasp of the internal and external reasons that motivate 
organizations to invest upfront in the implementation of voluntary initiatives, (e.g., code of 
conducts and new standards), marks the starting point of our study and enlightens the first phase 
of corporate success of CSR implementation. 
(2) Response selection: According to the second step in the model of adaptive behavior, we 
expect a selection of response to take place within companies that implement SCDD processes. 
Of course, this central step exhibits a path dependency as there may be different strategies and 
options for firms how to respond to these pressures, depending on their specific resources, 
experiences within CSR contexts, characteristics of supply chains, the particular supply chain 
position, and so on. Thus, we assume firms’ existent dynamic capabilities to be most important 
as dynamic capabilities are crucial for designing new strategies. As dynamic capabilities 
“determine the speed at, and degree to which, the firm’s particular resources can be aligned and 
realigned to match the requirements and opportunities of the business environment” (Teece, 
2012, p. 1395), it is this internal deliberation and selection process that enables a company to 
successfully exploit the implementation of the OECD Guidance by developing an own 
understanding of the SCDD process according to its already existing routines and capabilities. 
(3) Performance outcomes: Finally, in order to allow for an advanced analysis, we shed 
light on the performance outcomes, too. Although we expect in many cases a close link between 
the prospected benefits of implementing the OECD Guidance and SCDD processes and the 
initial motivation of companies to do so, the path dependency of the dynamic capability concept 
requires us to also investigate this last step of the adaptive behavior model.  
4. Methods 
An inductive multiple case study approach was selected to explore why and how companies 
implement SCDD in conflict minerals supply chains and what the expected performance 
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outcomes will be. This approach appeared to be adequate for the following four reasons: (1) To 
our knowledge, research on both, due diligence outside of financial contexts and conflict 
minerals is in its early stages (cp. Sarfaty, 2015) with only few published articles (e.g., 
Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013; Muchlinski, 2012; Rotter et al., 2014; Sarfaty, 2015); (2) 
SCDD on conflict minerals requires investigating multiple actors along various tiers of the 
supply chain. Therefore, the issue at hand constitutes a complex research problem rendering it 
to naturalistic inquiry in which insights are induced by interpretative means (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985); (3) Case study research is well-suited to study complex phenomena from different angles 
and to compare various organizational situations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1981; 2014); (4) The 
triangulation of data from multiple sources allows for mitigation of the social desirability bias 
which is inherent in the topic at stake (Crane, 1999). Table 2 provides an overview of the 
measures taken to address the concerns regarding validity and reliability throughout the course 
of our research. 
**** Please insert Table 2 about here **** 
4.1. Case selection and data collection 
Besides an extant literature review, preliminary expert interviews provided the foundations for 
developing the sampling frame. In order to gain in-depth insights into SCDD implementation, 
we followed the notion of Gerring (2007) and employed a diverse case selection technique. The 
study addresses five major industries which are impacted by conflict mineral issues: the 
automotive, aerospace and defense, electronics, technical hardware, and jewelry industry. Due 
to the novelty of the SCDD concept within the domain of the OECD countries and in light of 
an upcoming EU regulation (Global Witness, 2015), our study focuses on European firms.  
Furthermore, the sample mirrors the multi-tier setting of conflict minerals supply chains: 
OEMs are based far downstream with great end-consumer proximity. Thus, OEMs may be 
directly targeted by stakeholder requirements on SCDD (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, customer 
requirements, or NGO pressure). Component manufacturers exemplify small- or medium sized 
first-tier suppliers. Typically, these firms are only concerned with conflict minerals to the extent 
their direct customers demand it. Finally, metal refiners, smelters, and traders are positioned at 
lower tiers and interact directly with raw-material extracting firms. Thus they can provide first-
hand insights into the conditions in conflict and high-risk areas. In addition, metal refiners, 
smelters, and traders face enormous regulatory pressure as they are considered to be importers 
of conflict minerals and related metals to the European market. Hence, they represent the last 
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stage in which due diligence processes can effectively be assured by collecting, disclosing, and 
verifying information on a mineral’s origin and chain of custody (European Commission, 
2014). However, we did not include raw-material extracting firms from the DRC due to our 
focus on firms based in Europe as well as limited access to these sources. 
The companies within our dataset are headquartered in eight European countries, with 
strongest representation from Germany, UK, and France. They represent both, SMEs and large 
size companies (5 million EUR to 75 billion EUR in annual revenues) and amount to an overall 
sales volume of 347 billion EUR. Table 3 provides an overview of the participating companies. 
**** Please insert Table 3 about here **** 
Primary data was collected through a series of in-depth interviews with executives and 
managers in 27 companies. Respondents are mainly senior managers who are working in 
procurement or sustainability departments. However, our sample is also complemented by 
conflict mineral specialists, CEOs, and risk managers, thereby showcasing the variety of 
expertise that is needed to thoroughly tackle the issue of conflict minerals.  
All semi-structured interviews were conducted in February/March 2014 via telephone. At 
the same time, other information about the companies and their specific initiatives, such as 
companies’ website contents, CSR-reports, company codes of conduct and supplier policies, 
and third party certifications were also collected in order to lay the ground for later data 
triangulation and to strengthen and verify the use of the interview data (Dykstra et al., 2003; 
Gibbert et al., 2008; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Seale, 2000). On average, each interview 
lasted 60 minutes and all interviews were jointly conducted by the same two researchers. 
Reliability was accounted by means of an interview protocol including information on the 
interview procedure and context information (e.g., date of the interview and where and how 
archival data was collected). Finally, a case database stored individual notes on the spoken 
dialogue, transcripts from the interviews, and content from other sources of information 
(Gibbert et al., 2008; Yin, 2014).  
4.2. Coding 
The extracted data was analyzed by applying qualitative content analysis (Miles and Huberman, 
1994) and was led both by codes grounded in data and concepts established in related research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Yin, 2014). Thus, in structural equivalence to 
Litz’ (1996) model of adaptive behavior we screened each case for stimulus, response, and 
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performance outcome of SCDD adaption. In a first round of coding we used rather descriptive 
codes for the depiction of the interview content (open coding). Next, we pursued axial coding 
and gradually transformed descriptive codes into more abstract ones which were then 
condensed and related to each other. Furthermore, similar codes were grouped into themes and 
overarching dimensions. After each researcher individually coded each case, we discussed the 
obtained codes to increase inter-rater reliability (Pagell and Krause, 2005). In cases in which 
reviewers disagreed with each other the coding was repeated and discussed in order to reach a 
joint conclusion. In the very small number of cases where no similar interpretation could be 
found the respective codes were not further included in the final analysis. 
5. Analysis and results 
The following section presents the results of our exploratory study. We start by introducing 
patterns of SCDD implementation, as they lay the ground for recognizing relationships between 
these very patterns, stimuli, enablers and barriers, as well as expected impacts.  
5.1. Patterns of supply chain due diligence implementation 
Firms apply different patterns of SCDD implementation that vary across industries. For 
instance, while especially large firms from both electronics and automotive industry apply 
sophisticated approaches, surprisingly, jewelry firms are rather lagging in terms of SCDD 
implementation. This is particularly interesting, as one might expect jewelry firms to be notably 
aware of conflict resources’ risk potential. As Janssen et al. (2014) find, there are specific 
characteristics of luxury products that conclude in the acceptance of responsible luxury. Hence, 
there should be a bigger learning effect particularly in the jewelry industry. 
In the course of our overall analysis we specifically found patterns that are based on 
compliance, commitment, and analytical measures (cp. Table 4) resulting from firms’ 
individual practices to identify, trace, and remove conflict minerals from their supply chains. 
Table 5 illustrates groups of firms whose practices are predominantly allocated to a certain 
pattern. However, it needs to be emphasized that these three patterns are not mutually exclusive. 
Firms do not necessarily implement only one of these patterns. Rather, they apply mixed 
practices depending on their individual stage of SCDD implementation.  
**** Please insert Table 4 and 5 about here **** 
17 
 
Compliance practices are prevalent across all five industries. For this implementation pattern 
measures such as issuing codes of conduct, stating a conflict-free policy, or fostering ethical 
sourcing of conflict minerals via contractual provisions are characteristic. Compliance practices 
are usually enforced very strictly. Firms following this approach attempt to reorganize their 
supplier portfolios to focus on cooperation with large and experienced companies, whereas 
suppliers that do not adhere to compliance regimes are immediately replaced, if possible. As 
such practices require a dominant market position and a high degree of power over supply chain 
partners, compliance measures are usually implemented by larger firms downstream the supply 
chain. Locke et al. (2009) highlight that compliance-oriented approaches are mainly based on 
negative rules such as pressures, regular monitoring, and severe sanctions. In sum, these 
compliance patterns aim at setting up strict principles to govern conflict mineral management 
upstream.  
Commitment measures contrarily, comprise cooperative practices and firms that actively 
engage and support their suppliers towards fulfilling requirements for due diligence. We found 
this pattern particularly to be present in firms from the automotive, electronics, and technical 
hardware industries. These commitment-oriented approaches focus on positive values such as 
learning, collaboration, analysing root causes to problems, as well as incentives and mutual 
respect (Locke et al., 2009). This includes mainly efforts for awareness raising, staff education, 
and practical support. For instance, at a kick-off meeting, Engine A has raised the issue of 
conflict minerals as a collective responsibility of the whole supply chain and assisted its 
suppliers to provide required documentation. Although commitment is practiced only 
occasionally, those firms who apply this measure belong to the largest actors within their 
respective industries. Thus, we assume that commitment represents an innovative approach the 
strategic potential of which has not yet been widely recognized among firms.  
Analytical practices finally are common across all five industries but strongest among 
automotive companies. Firms that rely on analytical practices intend to gain detailed insights 
into the composition of sourced products. For instance, they assess the chemical structure of 
their product portfolio to obtain comprehensive and detailed information regarding the content 
of conflict minerals in sourced products. Based on this assessment, critical suppliers are 
identified and engaged to provide insights into sourcing activities and materials. Other firms 
identify critical products and suppliers based on a risk assessment. Analytical practices are 
prevalent at all firm sizes and supply chain positions. Opposed to the compliance patterns, firms 
applying analytical practices tend to lack supply chain compliance regimes. Thus, analytical 
practices might represent a preparatory step determining avenues for the compliance pattern. 
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5.2. Stimulus for firm’s awareness on conflict minerals and supply chain due diligence 
As a necessary precondition for SCDD implementation, firms’ awareness on the issue of 
conflict minerals needs to be stimulated. Similar to other transparency initiatives (e.g., 
certifications), due diligence implementation requires internal and external triggers (Bouslah et 
al., 2010). Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Jennings and Zandbergen, 1995; 
Oliver, 1991; Scott, 1987) offers a theoretical lens to group aspects that trigger firms’ 
implementation of sustainable practices (e.g., Bansal, 2005; Escobar and Vredenburg, 2011; 
Pedersen and Gwozdz, 2014). Accordingly, normative (professionalization of processes), 
mimetic (imitation of practices of other successful organizations), or coercive pressures 
(coercion by powerful actors) stimulate organizations to implement specific practices. 
Similarly, interviewees revealed regulative (e.g., Dodd-Frank Act), peer (e.g., activities of 
industry associations), and competitive pressures (e.g., customer requirements) as stimuli for 
their awareness of conflict minerals. Typically, firms are exposed to several stimuli at the same 
time. However, based on our interviews we categorize firms according to their most prominent 
trigger (cp. Table 6).  
**** Please insert Table 6 about here **** 
Regulative stimuli represent both enforceable regulation (Dodd-Frank Act) and 
recommendations on due diligence (OECD Guidance) and are prevalent at the majority of firms 
across all industries, firm sizes, and supply chain positions. For some firms regulative pressure 
is a necessary precondition to take up the issue of conflict minerals at all: “We would need an 
external impulse like the Dodd-Frank Act to deal with these issues and to implement them” 
(Engine D). Others are required to follow the Dodd-Frank Act as their major customers are 
based on the US market and thus pass on relevant regulation to their suppliers: “Our main 
customers are US-based. Thus, they are obliged to follow the Dodd-Frank Act and pass on these 
requirements to us, their customers” (Aero A). In sum, regulative pressures are not only directly 
stimulating SCDD implementation within a fixed geographic setting, but may also be pushed 
upstream and thus indirectly affect geographically dispersed firms.  
Peer pressure for firms to take action is caused by rising awareness among a large group of 
similar companies. Especially in the electronics and jewelry industries peer pressure evolves as 
industry associations are promoting conflict minerals management, for example, through 
issuing practical guidance or setting standards: “We have a strong manual containing all 
industry standards and issues and so we are also certified by the Royal Jewelry Council and we 
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are also looking at the sourcing protocols and we try to implement them back into our supplier 
manual” (Jewel A). Furthermore, informal industry groups were reported to create benchmarks 
and to provide a forum to discuss problems and best practices of conflict mineral management: 
“We are using an unofficial benchmarking with the major Swedish industry companies so that 
we can discuss our problems with each other, find some solutions and so on” (Engine C). As 
industry standards and benchmarking systems are usually scaled up experiences of pioneering 
firms, we conjecture that regulative pressures have been present in the first place yielding a 
critical group of first movers. Thus, peer pressure has to be located adjacent to regulative 
stimuli. 
Competitive stimuli occur, when suppliers are required to follow powerful customers’ 
provisions. For instance, lower tier actors at the refinery and smelter level reported that 
implementing SCDD was as necessary precondition for entering into business: “We have no 
choice, all you have to do is to comply, or you just get out of it. And personally … if I want to 
continue I have to be compliant” (Aero D). Above all, firms are often not dealing with conflict 
minerals until required by their customers to do so: “Due diligence at this point needs to be 
initiated by our customers, asking us to demonstrate if we are meeting the requirements” 
(Engine E). In sum, competitive stimuli emerge from downstream firms which are already 
engaged in conflict mineral management and that are striving to shift responsibility upstream.  
Based on this explanatory analysis, we identify relationships between the type of stimulus 
and patterns of implementation (cp. Table 7).  
First of all, firms that face regulative pressure choose in most instances compliance-oriented 
SCDD practices. Both Dodd-Frank Act and OECD Guidance provide extensive assistance on 
due diligence implementation and thus are likely to determine a sophisticated regime of supplier 
governance.  
Second, peer pressured firms apply each of the three implementation patterns. Yet, it does 
not surprise that some firms engage in compliance-oriented practices, as peer pressure was 
characterized as adjacent to regulative stimuli. On the other side, Jewel A and Jewel D rely on 
analytical practices which are well applicable to their gold-focused activities.  
Finally, competitive stimuli elicit mainly analytical practices. On the one hand, competitive 
stimuli represent urgent requests from key customers. On the other hand, they offer limited 
guidance on implementing due diligence practices within the upstream supply chain. Thus, 
firms under competitive pressure might refrain from time-consuming development of novel 
practices and rely on their already present analytical capabilities instead.  
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**** Please insert Table 7 about here **** 
5.3. Expected impact and performance of supply chain due diligence 
Implementing SCDD does not only enable firms to track and exclude conflict minerals from 
their supply chains. It delivers additional impacts on market performance (e.g., compliance and 
transparency), financial performance (e.g., satisfied customer requirements and reduced risk 
exposure), and relational assets (e.g., increased awareness and new strategic partnerships) (cp. 
Table 8). 
 **** Please insert Table 8 about here **** 
Market performance impacts of due diligence are found at downstream and upstream parts of 
the mineral supply chain. Electro A states that due diligence enables compliance with regulation 
but also to “satisfy the information needs of our customers”. In addition, market performance 
impacts of SCDD may also accrue upstream: “The benefits of compliance are primarily two 
things, one satisfying customers in their expectations and secondly, generally, reputation. […] 
We see a lot of benefits to the human rights situation in DRC and neighboring countries” 
(Engine E). This is in line with many other studies that either show potentially negative effects 
on reputation due to deficits in suppliers’ corporate social performance (e.g., Carter and 
Jennings, 2004) or that show positive effects due to actively governing CSR topics (e.g., 
Pedersen and Andersen, 2006). Taken together, market performance impacts of SCDD 
disseminate at both ends of the supply chain and tend to accrue for the whole supply chain 
instead of a single firm.  
In addition to its impacts on market performance, SCDD implementation contributes to 
improved financial performance, for example through mitigating costs caused by incurred 
risks: “Sharing information with suppliers and make suppliers be more open about their supply 
chains would help us to map potential risks […] you perhaps can identify certain pitch points 
within the supply chain where the risk maybe exist. And that might help corporates to protect 
them in the future by looking more to sourcing opportunities that do not take the forms of risks” 
(Auto D). Finally, firms expect that market performance will translate directly into financial 
benefits as Auto B explains: “We are able to demonstrate that our materials or components 
which are delivered to the OEM are not sourced from conflict- or high-risk areas. We use this 
as an asset for future tenders”. Engine D emphasizes business customers in a similar fashion: 
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“Our customers are large OEMs and they want to promote their products to be conflict-free”. 
Eventually, end consumers are perceived to yield cash flows as well: “The main […] benefit 
that will be customer goodwill in the US market and we hope that we will soon become conflict 
free and this would hopefully have a big impact on the US market” (Engine C). 
Finally, implementing SCDD involves both actors along the supply chain and stakeholders 
whose constant dialog generates new strategic networks and alliances (Doorey, 2011) and 
increases benefits for involved actors. This is also in line with Busse (2016) who points in this 
direction by identifying collaboration benefits as a positive mediating factor of how changes in 
sustainability-related conditions at a supplier influence buyers’ economic performance by 
fostering trust. As Carter and Jennings (2002) find, activities of sustainable supply chain 
management such as SCDD foster a positive reputation of the partner which increases trust and 
triggers relational benefits (e.g., better resolution of extant problems). 
 Thus, for Engine A, implementing SCDD has a clear relational impact: “I think it is a 
program which typically also in the EICC community has strengthened our relationship that I 
see as a real benefit. It was a program that urged us to work together more closely than we did 
before. And very active working groups are created, very strong and active networks and very 
close cooperation. That will have a spin off in later stages, where other legislations or issues 
are popping up so we have a strong network in the industry based on this approach”. One 
company only affirms relational impacts. Nevertheless they represent a key aspect of 
implementing supply chain wide due diligence processes which due to the novelty of the issue 
may have gone unnoticed so far. 
Drawing on Table 9, relations between implementation patterns and impacts become 
apparent. First, compliance-oriented practices are associated with both market performance and 
financial performance. On the one hand, compliance-oriented practices are built upon regulative 
and multi-stakeholder based frameworks that aim to manage human rights problems around 
conflict minerals. Thus, market performance impacts might indicate the successful execution 
of these frameworks. On the other hand, financial benefits accrue for most compliance-oriented 
firms, irrespective of size and supply chain position supplementing their profit maximizing 
orientation.  
Second, the commitment pattern leads to market performance, relational assets, and financial 
performance benefits. Whereas financial performance impacts might point at the complexity 
reducing effect of coordinated due diligence implementation, market performance impacts 
exemplify a conjoint approach to improve the upstream human rights situation. 
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Finally, analytical practices lead to market performance and financial performance impacts. 
Market performance impacts of analytical practices are reported especially far upstream at 
refineries and smelters whereas financial benefits are present at larger downstream firms. Thus, 
the pinch point of the mineral supply chain – namely smelters and refineries – is under constant 
pressure to contribute to due diligence systems but is at the same time hardly able to develop 
sufficient governance measures let alone market-based benefits. 
**** Please insert Table 9 about here **** 
5.4. Enablers and barriers of implementing supply chain due diligence  
Implementing SCDD requires not only several facilitators but also overcoming hurdles. 
Executives cited several external and internal factors that serve as critical enablers (cp. Table 
10). Similarly, hurdles for SCDD implementation may occur internally and externally (cp. 
Table 11). 
**** Please insert Table 10 about here **** 
External tools and support systems enable standardized information exchange between firms 
which is a central tenet of SCDD (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013; New, 2010; Pagell and Wu, 
2009). In particular, tools and programs developed by the Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative 
(CFSI) are facilitating the development of governance systems and information exchange 
between upstream and downstream actors. Moreover, relying on the CFSI does not only involve 
using templates but is in fact a trusting relationship and division of labor (i.e., CFSI offers audits 
of smelters). The International Material Data System (IMDS) is applied in the automotive 
industry. Relying on that system, Auto D developed a very sophisticated analytical practice to 
detect conflict mineral-containing products. Likewise, the jewelry industry complimented 
relevant intelligence tools and expressed willingness to extend their use. 
Implementing due diligence along the whole supply chain requires involving multiple 
geographically dispersed actors and it is mostly the downstream actors’ responsibility to push 
due diligence upstream. Thus, both power and trust are important enablers for compliance, 
commitment, and analytical practices. For instance, some executives complained that their 
activities would be more advanced if there would be more leverage on their side.  
Another perspective on power is introduced by an executive from the automotive industry. 
Although his firm is in a dominant position, there is not sufficient leeway to get suppliers 
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involved. For some firms, implementing due diligence within the rather unregulated European 
market is a strategic decision they are reluctant to take as a first mover. Accordingly, regulation 
presents a trust-building facilitator demanding concerted levels of supply chain transparency 
among all firms, curtailing concerns of competitive disadvantage (Doorey, 2011), and enabling 
exchange of confidential information (Hannah, 2005).  
As a key internal enabler raising awareness of and commitment to programs on conflict 
minerals, internal management support was cited. For instance, a clear mission statement from 
the CEO of Jewel D was critical to set the spirit for a successful conflict minerals campaign. 
**** Please insert Table 11 about here **** 
As a major external barrier for SCDD implementation, some executives criticize relevant 
regulation and guidance on conflict minerals for being unclear. For instance central aspects like 
‘reasonable efforts’ (OECD Guidance) are undefined and reliable benchmarks to evaluate 
firms’ activities are not available. Furthermore, regulative frameworks are only focused on the 
US market. In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act does only target SEC-filing companies. Indeed, 
Asian or African as well as small or medium sized firms are not obliged to perform due 
diligence on conflict minerals, thus impeding for example compliance practices of downstream 
firms.  
Another obstacle for due diligence implementation is directly market-driven: some firms are 
tied to static supplier relationships forcing them to stick with (problematic) suppliers or to even 
resign from driving a strict conflict minerals policy. A further market-given fact is affirmed by 
Electro A stating that the number of certified smelters is currently too low in order to facilitate 
a conflict-free minerals supply chain. If paired with low levels of power, market-driven barriers 
may leave firms unable to implement sophisticated compliance processes and to stick to the 
analytical pattern. 
In addition to these barriers, firms at all stages of the supply chain struggle with the high 
complexity of their individual supply chains. Several firms reported a great distance to relevant 
upstream actors such as smelters and refineries, leaving them incapable of enforcing 
compliance practices. Furthermore, the products of downstream firms are highly complex 
impeding a comprehensive analytical fingerprint. However, complexity is not only a 
downstream issue. Even firms that are supposed to be at arms-length to raw material stages are 
overstrained to perform analytical practices on multiple actors. The commitment pattern may 
serve as remedy as its cooperative and coordinated character overcomes complexity issues. 
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Furthermore, implementing SCDD could be very costly depending on a firm’s supplier 
portfolio (Fasterling and Demuijnck, 2013). Especially in the upstream supply chain, 
substantial investments are required to establish fundamental mechanisms. Furthermore, the 
quality of obtained information strongly depends on the know-how and education within the 
supply chain.  
Overall, complying with all requests for due diligence is a huge administrative burden for 
small upstream firms. In this regard, firms might outsource compliance requests (e.g., CFSI 
certification) and apply analytical practices instead to identify the origins of conflict minerals.  
**** Please insert Figure 3 about here **** 
Discussion 
The following paragraphs outline the theoretical and managerial implications of our research. 
Within the theoretical part, SCDD is discussed from a critical-normative as well as a business 
management perspective (cp. Drebes, 2014) particularly with a focus on how SCDD contributes 
to the wider field of political CSR. Moreover, we relate our findings to the newly emerging 
stream of multi-tier supply chain management research (e.g., Mena et al., 2013). As a major 
managerial contribution, we offer recommendations for industry-wide SCDD implementation. 
We conclude with a critical discussion of limitations and provide avenues for further research.   
5.5. Theoretical implications 
The social problems linked to conflict minerals are part of a broader discussion on human rights 
violations and imply an extension of the classical CSR concept to a politically coined one 
(Whelan, 2012). Caused by the increasing globalization in the last decades, national and 
international regulations have continuously eroded, leaving behind a tremendous gap in 
institutional governance instruments and processes (Matten and Crane, 2005; Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011), as also perfectly indicated in the conflict mineral case (cp. Rotter et al., 2014).  
Starting in the mid of the 2000s, research has actively called for a debate about the role of 
business entities under these changing circumstances (Matten and Crane, 2005; Walsh, 2005). 
In light of this discourse, firms are expected to at least partially fill out this regulative gap by 
taking up responsibilities that traditionally fall within states’ spheres of influence (Scherer and 
Palazzo, 2011). Accordingly, in the conflict minerals context, firms can meet their 
responsibilities through SCDD. Whelan (2012) states particularly two reasons why the link 
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between multinational companies and this new gap is striking and applicable to the conflict 
mineral context as well: On the one hand, these companies operate in countries and regions that 
usually fall far behind Western democratic and liberal standards in terms of social and 
environmental regulations and on the other hand, the normative force of the factual has proven 
companies to already play important roles in creating new standards, public goods, and 
international regulative patterns.  
In our sample we identify three different patterns of SCDD implementation: analytical, 
compliance, and commitment. These patterns differ significantly from each other and also 
reflect distinction in companies’ CSR implementation. In case of analytical SCDD 
implementation, firms merely apply minimum requirements necessitated by stronger supply 
chain members, which does not fulfill the actual role of political CSR. Hence, the root causes 
of the conflict mineral problems are not addressed but rather avoided from a risk management 
point of view. Interestingly, this analytical approach is strongly prevalent in the automotive 
industry which is usually very advanced in terms of data availability and maturity of supply 
chain processes (e.g., Groetsch et al., 2013). Further these firms also claim to be very active in 
CSR, demonstrating that conflict mineral management is to a certain extent decoupled from 
their activities, which also shows that proficiency in supply chain management itself rather fuels 
conflicts in upstream supply chains than solving them. This raises serious doubts about CSR 
projects of firms which do not tackle major problems related to their business model, but rather 
concentrate on those topics that do not touch their business model.  
 Similarly, compliance-driven firms rather pursue SCDD as they are pressured to do so by 
customer requirements. This often also leads to the avoidance of sourcing conflict minerals 
from the DRC region. Yet, in both cases these implementation patterns do not really entail 
responsibilities that traditionally fall within states’ spheres of influence. Only in cases in which 
firms really commit themselves to SCDD by strongly implementing the OECD Guidance, 
raising awareness for the topic of conflict minerals in general, and by working jointly and 
collaboratively with NGOs on solving the problems in the region, firms really tend to fill the 
above mentioned governance gaps and help to address root causes of these problems.  
The different patterns of SCDD emergence can partly also be explained by Litz’ (1996) 
model as stimuli influence the direction of implementation patterns of SCDD, also in the case 
of conflict minerals. Based on our findings, regulative pressure and peer pressure rather lead to 
analytical and compliance-driven implementation patterns of SCDD, whereas competitive 
pressure results particularly more often in analytical patterns. This strongly shows that different 
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forms of SCDD implementation are influenced by external stimuli. Interestingly however, it is 
not possible to explain commitment approaches based on these external pressures alone.  
Thorough SCDD implementation taking on political CSR roles seems to be represented 
across sectors and different kinds of stimuli. Yet, our results indicate that smaller firms and 
firms further up in the supply chain are less likely to dedicate their resources towards a real 
commitment to SCDD implementation. Hence, the phase of deliberation as per the model of 
Litz (1996) is strongly influenced by factors internal to the firm such as values, management 
commitment, etc. This is also in line with the ongoing debate in strategic CSR, which studies 
how market and competitive considerations influence CSR activities, and how companies strive 
to reach competitive advantage by combining economic and social/ethical value creation (e.g., 
Crane et al., 2014; McWilliams et al., 2006). Specifically this also refers to Weaver et al. 
(1999)’s study in which they show that institutional pressures and internal factors have to fit in 
order to achieve CSR performance. Especially management commitment and values are 
important drivers in their study. Along those lines our study shows an important interplay of 
stimuli perceptions and the deliberate response that influence the pursuit of political CSR. 
The last stage of Litz’ (1996) model is dedicated to performance outcomes. All firms in our 
sample, no matter which implementation strategy they pursue, apparently benefit from market 
performance, whereas short-term financial benefits (e.g., through reduction of risks) play a less 
important role. Although, based on our explorative approach we can’t reliably assess whether 
these market performance benefits are of significantly different size for the three 
implementation patterns, so far it seems that all implementation patterns help to improve the 
image of firms with respect to conflict minerals. This is particularly the case with regard to 
achieving more goodwill of clients and customers through signaling better reputation. These 
findings suggest to a certain extent that commitment-based approaches, specifically as they 
require more committed resources due to the complexity of the task, are not leading to short-
term benefits of firms. However, at the same time this also means that the current system of 
managing supply chains is set up in a manner, in which root cause problems in DRC will not 
be addressed as only a small proportion of firms thoroughly take care of these issues. Perhaps, 
this fact is linked to the circumstance that consumers are not yet familiar with variations in 
different implementation patterns as well as the novelty of the topic. This is in line with similar 
problems for other proactive measures of CSR and/or environmental management (e.g., cp. 
discussions on labels, standards, and certificates, CO2-emission measurement systems, etc.). In 
this regard, this insight also provides a new nuance to the literature that investigated 
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performance effects of CSR where a majority of large scale empirical studies indeed found 
significant financial effects (for an overview see Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
A positive side effect for committed firms comprises relational assets. These relational assets 
result from networks and structures by collaborative approaches to supply chain management 
in general. Yet, although there is a vast stream in the literature which has shown that 
collaborative approaches to supply chain management might render relational rents (e.g., Fu 
and Piplani, 2004; Gulati and Sytch, 2007), so far this effect has perhaps been overlooked in 
conflict mineral management as we could unravel relational considerations only in one case 
(Engine A). As extracted from the Engine A case, there is a high potential to build new dynamic 
capabilities through relational SCDD approaches with external partners, which in turn could 
help to address emerging future (political) CSR issues of a similar kind. Intuitively, conflict 
minerals are not to be the last commodity in the context of which firms will be required to 
pursue political CSR. From this perspective, it is interesting that only a very small portion of 
firms is prepared to learn and prepare systematically for further challenges of a similar kind. 
In supply chain management theories and studies there is a still a focus on first tier suppliers 
and the focal dyad (Tachizawa and Wong, 2014) often resulting in an enormous pressure on the 
weakest links in the chain. From a SCDD perspective however, it does not suffice to keep such 
a limited scope but instead to apply multi-tier instruments and procedures that also actively 
incorporate those Global South suppliers that often have to bear the greatest burden. 
Consequently, this article is contributing in answering the call for research beyond dyadic 
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g., Abbasi and Nilsson, 2012) and thereby extending the recently 
emerging literature on multi-tier supply chain management theories (e.g., Mena et al., 2013; 
Tachizawa and Wong, 2014). Tachizawa and Wong (2014) already pointed out to four different 
multi-tier governance mechanisms firms can apply in order to approach topics such as CSR or 
sustainability that are multi-causal and multi-tier. By identifying three different approaches 
regarding how SCDD is implemented within corporate practice, we contribute to this existent 
literature on supply chain governance and their theoretical foundations. Also this literature of 
multi-tier supply chain management could benefit from interconnecting with literature on 
political CSR as classical supply chain management instruments fail to address these concerns.  
The discussion about chain liability (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014) that emerges from the 
multi-tier character of supply chains opens up a new dimension of assigning responsibility to 
companies in contexts, where there is no direct causal relationship between downstream 
companies and the origin of human rights violations. This raises a lot of interesting questions 
as the traditional concept of ascribing responsibility is apparently annulled, at least from a 
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causal-responsibility point of view, where an actor is responsible for an event, if a) she caused 
it; b) she acted voluntarily; and c) she has been aware of the consequences associated with her 
action(s) (Hart, 1968). SCDD and political CSR advocate liability-responsibility in the case of 
conflict minerals, even though firms might not directly cause these problems. From this 
perspective, SCDD and other approaches towards political CSR flow into an expansion of 
responsibilities and even transcend the normative claims of stakeholder theory (Whelan, 2012): 
Social conflicts that occur in DRC outreach European OEMs’ scope of stakeholders – defined 
as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
organization's objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46) – since it is questionable that those remote 
groups have a direct link to the OEMs objectives. As responsibility of firms is originally not 
included in supply chain concepts it is important to extend supply chain management research 
accordingly. Not least due to the severe impacts focal firms are able to “cause” in sourcing 
countries. Hence, not only the multiplicity of intertwined social conflicts, but also the challenge 
to mitigate these over numerous tiers makes conflict minerals a problem that lies beyond the 
scope of individual firms’ governance systems or compliance regimes (Rotter et al., 2014).  
By introducing political CSR further into the context of multi-tier supply chains our study 
evokes further critical discussion which we will address in three steps, leading to important 
implications and future research directions also for supply chain management research: 
First, power is still underrepresented in the discourse about (political) CSR practices, 
particularly from a structural perspective (Drebes, 2014). As the analysis has shown, 
particularly smaller upstream suppliers have fewer incentives to implement SCDD beyond 
purely analytical implementation patterns and simultaneously fewer resources to do so, 
resulting in relatively loose coupling. Hence from a power imbalance perspective, it is at least 
arguable, if strong Western firms are in such a powerful position from which they can directly 
exploit their suppliers by complying with SCDD mechanisms. As Drebes (2014, p. 7) states: 
“[…] by acting in certain ways (for example by implementing social standards in factories) they 
[multinational corporations] exert power over the actions of others2, for example their suppliers 
or the workers in the supplier factories”. 
Although requirements for SCDD might be acceptable from a purely liberal and business-
oriented as well as from a juridical point of view, still fairness considerations are to be 
considered in supplier exploitation relationships (Schleper et al., 2015). Power imbalances and 
                                                          
2 Drebes’ argument is mainly based on Foucault’s definition of a relationship of power as “a mode of 
action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an 
action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future” 
(Foucault, 1982, p. 789). 
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different degrees of mutual dependencies are prerequisites for exploitative scenarios (Schleper 
et al., 2015) and far from being equally distributed in corporate practice (Nyaga et al. 2013). In 
supply chains in which companies from the Global South are involved, these power imbalances 
are expected to be even stronger as internationally acting companies can easily outsource their 
‘easy-labor’ products to other locations (Drebes, 2014). This exit-option shows structural power 
differences among corporations in times in which labor is much more immobile than capital 
(Merk, 2009). Yet, these structural power imbalances are constructions of social interactions 
and not a given thing and hence could be overcome by better institutional frameworks and 
changing individuals’ and companies’ conceptions of these issues. Although some scholars 
point out that indirect supplier upstream are not directly influenced by the power of large buying 
firms (cp. Grimm et al., 2011), it is at least questionable if lower-tier suppliers are not directly 
influenced by the power of large buying firms. Of course, there exists a lack of information and 
direct control mechanisms which diminishes the direct influence of focal firms. However, 
taking a critical perspective with regard to power imbalances, it is arguable that between lower-
tier suppliers in the Global South (i.e., DRC and adjunct regions) and focal firms a mediated 
power relationship exists. Intermediary frameworks created in Western institutions such as 
standards, certification processes, International Organizations and other mechanisms (e.g., 
SCDD) can result in a structural power regime. As these structures and institutions are often 
controlled by Western actors (e.g., World Trade Organization, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, etc.) they represent to some degree varieties of Western imperialism and hence 
neocolonialism3 (Prasad, 2003; Young, 2001). As a result, these structural power mechanisms 
allow multinational focal firms to influence their indirect suppliers. Yet as mentioned before, 
smaller suppliers might not have the potential to absorb the pressure in an appropriate way, 
resulting in loose coupling reactions with rather analytical implementation patterns of SCDD 
as well as exploitative situations (Schleper et al., 2015). 
Second, ascribing multinational companies a state-like role, as political CSR does, 
immediately evokes the question of legitimacy of this new role. Regardless of how strong 
stakeholders’ expectations in terms of stakeholder accountability (Parmigiani et al., 2011) or 
chain liability (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014) may be, first and foremost, focal firms are 
focusing on their core task which is the management of multitier supply chain networks from a 
                                                          
3 Prasad (2003, p. 6) defines neocolonialism as the “continuation of Western colonialism by 
nontraditional means” although the former colonies in the Global South are de facto independent. 
Besides economic and political dimensions of control, these means also include cultural control. 
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business management perspective and not from a political CSR perspective. This leads to two 
legitimacy and accountability problems.  
On the one hand, stakeholders rarely care about the actual capabilities of these focal firms 
in collecting reliable and accurate information on their supply chain networks and their 
influence on other actors in preventing misconduct (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Supply 
chains are built continuously over time with a strong focus on either efficiency or 
responsiveness (Fine, 2000; Fisher, 1997) and not with a main goal of being sustainable or 
ethical. Thus, as Gualandris and Pagell (2015) state, there exists an “accountability gap” 
between stakeholders and focal firms as the latter fall short of keeping pace with accountability 
expectations of stakeholders.  
On the other hand, legitimacy questions arise with regard to the relationships between the 
new state-like companies and their quasi- governed actors in the Global South (in this case the 
DRC) (Rotter et al., 2014). This aspect is linked to the power imbalance perspective as 
described above. Although many different theories and arguments in the literature about 
political CSR exist on how legitimacy in these relationships can be justified (e.g., Habermasian 
discourse ethics, institutional theory, or Rawlsian considerations on justice, for a detailed 
overview see Frynas and Stevens, 2014), still there needs to be the possibility to hear the voices 
of those that are mainly affected by conflicts as well as potential solutions (i.e., SCDD and other 
regulative standards). Against the background of discourse ethics and a Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance, those who are to be governed should have the opportunity of participating in the 
discourse as equally entitled actors (Mueller et al., 2009). However, these perspective are still 
severely underrepresented (Banerjee, 2010).  
 Third, it remains unclear if the real intentions of companies are what they pretend to be, or 
if at least some of them just act in a mode of paying lip-service. As Rotter et al. (2014) highlight 
it is questionable if corporate actors really aim at an improvement of human rights conditions 
within conflict countries. Rather, they could be motivated by legitimacy pressures of local 
stakeholders or upcoming mimetic reasons due to initiatives like the OECD Guidance. Thus, 
one should not be too optimistic in terms of enlightened firms that see themselves as substitutes 
for states or other regulative bodies. As Rotter et al. (2014, p. 597) state “despite the political 
power they wield, [companies’] identity is still tied to that of a profit-making organization”. 
This leads us directly to a more pragmatic and risk-based view on SCDD.  
Besides this normative perspective on the importance of managing conflict minerals, the 
topic also poses complex risks for firms, particularly for those located downstream supply 
chains as the analysis with a result of six companies has shown. Yet, Grimm et al. (2011) point 
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out that the more upstream the position of a supplier, generally, the more problems are linked 
to it, at least in terms of CSR and sustainability issues. This is the case due to particularly four 
inherent aspects: Lower-tier suppliers 1. are not directly influenced by the power of large 
buying firms, 2. do not provide much information, 3. are less accessible for external stakeholder 
pressure since they are small, relatively unknown by the public, and operating in countries with 
low CSR and sustainability standards, and 4. are easier to replace by supply chain partners 
which significantly lowers their relative importance for larger downstream firms (Tachizawa 
and Wong, 2014).  
Finally, SCDD can be interpreted as a concept that emerged predominantly in the conflict 
mineral supply chain, but that provides proof that firms realistically can manage conflict 
mineral supply chains without just stopping to source from certain regions, causing further 
social issues in the affected regions. SCDD patterns thus inform research also for further 
commodities as well as for cases where firms produce complex products. 
5.6. Managerial implications 
Exchange with executives emphasized the novelty of the issue of conflict minerals and revealed 
a misalignment of due diligence practices along the supply chain. Based on our analysis, we 
propose a robust recommendation for SCDD implementation.  
First, downstream companies are usually in a powerful position and are affected by 
regulation on conflict minerals. In addition, these firms are generally aware of relevant guidance 
on SCDD implementation. Moreover, they possess the resources to establish or already have in 
place sophisticated supply chain governance mechanisms. Hence for effective supply chain 
wide SCDD downstream firms should rely on compliance practices. To facilitate the 
implementation of compliance practices, downstream firms are suggested to adapt to the 
commitment pattern: raising and living a culture of collective responsibility and assisting their 
suppliers in meeting compliance requirements will accelerate the prevalence of SCDD. Above 
all, for downstream firms the market performance impact of compliance practices will be 
supplemented by relational impacts of commitment offering mid-term benefits (i.e., 
strengthened industry relationships). This is particularly true for situations in which the power 
imbalance within a supply chain network is quite high in favor of the focal firm in Western 
countries compared to suppliers in the Global South. As previous studies in the field of power 
relations within supply chain networks have shown, power abuse can have negative effects on 
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the powerful actor4 (Emerson, 1962; Lawler, 1992; Kim et al., 2005). This might be the case as 
suppliers become resistant to the pressure of the stronger focal firms and start to behave 
deceptively and opportunistically in these scenarios. Hence, what is needed is a more critical 
and fairness-oriented perspective of managers in these strong focal firms towards a “thinking 
in suppliers’ shoes” (Schleper et al., 2015).  
Second, first-tier suppliers are either subject to regulation themselves or they receive 
competitive pressure from customers. Depending on available resources and the maturity of the 
conflict minerals issue in their organization, component manufacturers should engage either in 
analytical or compliance practices. In case of developed governance systems and certain 
awareness on conflict minerals, it is best to fulfill and to pass on requests for compliance. 
Analytical practices are a valuable avenue for firms that are confronted with compliance 
requests for the first time. Once they have identified critical products and suppliers, compliance 
practices are a reasonable supplement. 
Third, smelters and refineries are confronted with a high amount of regulative and customer 
pressures but often lack sufficient resources to fulfill these requests. One remedy would be to 
outsource compliance measures to downstream funded third party certification organizations 
(i.e., CFSI), thereby reducing compliance costs upstream but at the same time ensuring 
reliability of certification. Hence, applying analytical practices is ideal for smelters and 
refineries. As they usually source unrefined conflict minerals, chemical analyses can verify the 
geographical origin of respective minerals. 
The issue of conflict minerals is exemplary for other upstream CSR issues. For instance, the 
production of palm oil, soybeans or tropical timber contributes in some areas to environmental 
conflicts. Similar to conflict minerals, palm oil or soybeans from stubbed rain forests can be 
mixed with unproblematic or certified batches eliminating any further attempts for back-tracing. 
In addition, once uncertified tropical timber is built into furniture, it becomes very difficult to 
trace the origin of each component. Thus, due diligence represents a viable first step for the 
currently unregulated supply chains of soybeans and palm oil and an alternative to established 
certification schemes in the timber industry. 
Our study provides also strong recommendations to public authorities impacting the legal 
framework. Exchange with executives suggests that many firms will only undertake rigorous 
SCDD when they can see a directly quantifiable short-term economic benefit or when they are 
                                                          
4 The most pertinent expression in this regard might be “to use power is to lose it” coined by 
Bacharach and Lawler (1986). 
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forced by law to implement these practices. This is particularly true for firms that face low 
levels of public scrutiny. While proactive actors who attempt to fully commit to the OECD 
voluntary standards do exist, they benefit only to a certain extent as end consumers do not have 
sufficient transparency on due diligence practices across firms. We would suggest that the 
OECD Guidance is a viable option for SCDD to which firms should adhere. However, only 
legal requirements for compliance can change company behavior on a broader scale. Exceptions 
do exist in cases where industry consortia jointly change the industry landscape, but these 
initiatives could also be further enabled through a mandatory OECD Due Diligence standard in 
the EU. 
5.7. Limitations and further research 
Exploratory research has always limitations that are first of all based on the limited sample size. 
Despite our effort to collect data across industries, firm sizes, varying stages in the supply chain, 
our findings are limited to this specific sample. We mainly addressed firms in Europe that might 
follow the OECD guidance on conflict minerals, but are to a larger extent not forced by law to 
follow conflict mineral management practices.  
Thus, one of the main limitations refers to the above mentioned neocolonial aspect: The 
question about liability and responsibility in terms of political CSR and conflict minerals is 
usually linked to one community’s reference point – in our case a Western culture perspective. 
In this regard, an irresponsible act is “either illegal or morally inacceptable to the larger 
community” (Jones, 1991, p. 367), which suggests a communitarian and thus geographically 
and cultural limited understanding of responsibility (Schrempf, 2012). In fact, several studies 
have emphasized that firms’ pursued CSR activities are shaped by the domestic institutional 
political structures and global policies they face (e.g., Detomasi, 2008; Fransen, 2013). 
However, only few studies have critically highlighted that a more critical and questioning logic 
needs to be applied in order to uncover and eradicate neocolonial pitfalls, thereby recalibrating 
relationships that affect the “Global South” in which most of the producers in global supply 
chains are located (e.g., Drebes, 2014; Munshi and Kurian, 2007). Thus, Drebes (2014, p. 3) 
argues that “CSR needs to be discussed with a different and non-mainstream theoretical 
approach”. Although we strive to provide a critical view on SCDD practices, the incorporation 
of especially smaller upstream suppliers from the Global South is needed in future research.  
Moreover, findings for US companies with stricter laws, but also for firms from countries 
where the management of conflict minerals plays a minor role in the public debate might 
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therefore differ. We encourage future research to investigate the impact of the cultural and legal 
impact on sustainability practices, specifically for SCDD practices.  
Also we worked in our research to a large extent with perceptual data, even though secondary 
data was used for triangulation purposes. Due to this fact social responsibility bias might 
specifically impact the perceived performance impacts. Even though great care was taken we 
suggest investigating performance impact on the triple bottom line with externally validated 
data. 
Another shortcoming of our study – even though this also provides more focus to the study 
– is the strong focus on the upstream supply chain. Specifically end consumers were not taken 
into account in the study design and it would be interesting to test whether SCDD practices 
impact end consumers’ willingness to pay. This could be further combined with experimental 
manipulations of the origin of the minerals together with different due diligence practices as 
well as product and supply chain complexity concerns. 
Last, other studies have depicted effects of other contingency variables such as power, 
dependency, distance, or knowledge resources (e.g., Tachizawa and Wong, 2014) that also 
might be interesting in investigating multi-tier governance mechanism and patterns of 
implementation of SCDD.  
Overall, these shortcomings suggest that theory testing research by the use of survey data or 
experimental data might pave the way for further explanatory insights on SCDD practices. This 
research proposes first directions for hypothesis grounded investigations. 
6. Conclusion 
This article is among the first to explore the promotion of CSR into the upstream supply chain 
by using SCDD. To govern social problems linked to the extraction of and trade with conflict 
minerals, SCDD represents the most comprehensive approach. In particular, SCDD integrates 
all relevant supply chain actors into a chain of custody tracking from mine up to the export level 
until the end consumer interface. As a result, downstream firms are able to verify the origin of 
conflict minerals and to prevent harmful stakeholder reactions.  
However, both conflict minerals and SCDD are novel issues for practice and scholarly 
research. Thus, our study provides first empirical insights into the implementation of SCDD 
among the European automotive, aerospace and defense, electronics, technical hardware, and 
jewelry industry. Our results contribute to the conceptual clarity of SCDD and provide first 
directions for future theory testing research in the context of conflict minerals and SCDD. 
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Additionally, we provide a thorough snapshot of corporate practices, key enablers, and barriers 
regarding the implementation of SCDD. By grouping the initially dispersed findings into 
different implementation patterns, we were able to offer recommendations for an effective 
industry and supply chain wide implementation, thereby enhancing supply chain wide CSR. 
Our theoretical contributions are threefold: First, we extend Litz’ (1996)s model and show 
the importance of factors that are internal to the firm (i.g., values) that determine a firm’s action 
to political CSR challenges. Interestingly, firms do not benefit differently in the short run by 
filling or not filling out their political CSR roles, neither from a market or financial performance 
perspective. Second, our study provides significant critique of classical supply chain 
management approaches which do not address CSR issues from a supply perspective from the 
Global South. In most firms, supply chain management is currently set up to rather avoid the 
problem of conflict minerals by not sourcing in conflict-laden regions then to address the root 
causes of these problems. The missing debate as well as the found evidence of poor spread 
practices such as SCDD raise concerns if CSR approaches rather follow a neocolonial rationale 
instead of actually pursuing a substantial way to ease conflicts in the Global South. Third, we 
provide different empirical patterns and antecedents for dealing with the newly discussed chain 
liability effect, proposing an exploratory model which provides the ground for future theory 
testing research.  
Although there is no one size fits all approach for managing conflict minerals via the use of 
SCDD, it has become obvious that everyday consumers and firms are affected by the issue of 
conflict minerals and that there exists an (in-)direct link between us and social problems in 
conflict areas. Thus, it should also be within the scope of these actors’ responsibility to remedy 
the issues at hand by filling regulative gaps in terms of a more sophisticated (and normative) 
approach towards political CSR. 
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Tables & Figures  
Table 1: Existing practices to increase transparency along supply chains 
Practice Approach, Focus, and Risk Perception  
 
Certification Approach: Assessment of corporate processes and production conditions (i.e., self-, 
second- or third party audit) against specific standards (e.g., UTZ, Fair Trade label, 
Kimberley Process certificate) 
Focus: Single firm 
Risk perception: Adherence to issues stated in specific standard’s catalogue 
Chain of Custody Approach: Assessment of corporate processes and production conditions at every 
company with financial ownership of the respective product to establish certified chain 
(e.g., Forest Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council) 
Focus: Entire value chain 
Risk perception: Adherence to issues stated in specific standard’s catalogue 
Traceability Approach: Following the physical movement of materials through specific stages of 
production, processing, and distribution 
Focus: Materials 
Risk perception: Product / materials not meeting quality requirements 
Due Diligence Approach: Gathering of internal and external information and gaining a sound 
knowledge of the company, its industry, financial condition, customers, competitors, 
suppliers, business processes, technology and, above all, management; sharing relevant 
upstream information with downstream partners 
Focus: Single firm 
Risk perception: Adherence to regulatory and/or voluntary requirements 
 
Table 2: Validity measures 
 
 
Research Phase 
Validity/ 
Reliability 
Criterion 
Design Case Selection Data Gathering Data Analysis 
Construct 
Validity 
Questions built on 
research 
framework  
NA Multiple sources of 
information 
Multiple interviewers 
Data triangulation 
based on 
independent 
sources 
Internal 
Validity 
Theoretical 
framework 
NA Most knowledgeable 
respondents for 
conflict minerals 
and SCDD 
interviewed 
Pattern matching 
among cases 
External 
Validity 
Description of 
sampling criteria 
Precise description of 
case firms, 
context, and 
situation  
NA NA 
Reliability Develop case study 
protocol 
Develop case study 
data set 
Selection within EU 
Selection including 
most relevant 
actors  
Transcription of all 
interviews by 
interviewers 
Semi-structured 
interview guidelines  
Involvement of 
authors who did not 
gather data 
Convergence of 
interpretations 
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Table 3: Participating organizations. 
Company  
Industrial 
Sector 
Size Turnover 
Supply Chain 
Position 
Department of 
Interviewee 
Auto A Automotive Large > EUR 60bn Component 
Manufacturer 
Purchasing, CSR and 
Conflict Minerals 
Auto B Automotive Large > EUR 10bn Component 
Manufacturer 
Logistics and Quality 
Auto C Automotive Large  > EUR 10bn OEM  Corporate Sustainability 
Auto D Automotive Large > EUR 20bn OEM Purchasing Risk and 
Supply Chain 
Sustainability  
Auto E Automotive Large > EUR 50bn OEM Environment, Energy and 
Strategic Raw Materials 
Auto F Automotive Small   > EUR 10m Trader CEO 
Aero A Aerospace/ 
Defense 
Large > EUR 10bn OEM Purchasing and Logistics 
Aero B Aerospace/ 
Defense 
Small  > EUR 10m Component 
Manufacturer 
Purchasing  
Aero C Aerospace/ 
Defense 
Large  > EUR 50bn OEM Sustainability, 
Environment and CSR 
Aero D Aerospace/ 
Defense 
Medium  > EUR 20m Trader CEO 
Electro A Electronics Large  > EUR 80bn OEM Conflict Minerals 
Electro B Electronics Large  > EUR 30bn OEM Conflict Minerals 
     Supplier Sustainability 
Electro C Electronics Large  > EUR 20bn OEM CSR and Purchasing  
Electro D Electronics Large  > EUR 200m Component 
Manufacturer 
Purchasing 
Electro E Electronics Large > EUR 400m Component 
Manufacturer 
Procurement 
Electro F Electronics Small  > EUR 15m Trader CEO 
Engine A Engineering Large  > EUR 5bn OEM Corporate Risk 
Engine B Engineering Small  > EUR 10m OEM Production 
Engine C Engineering Large  > EUR 5bn OEM Environment 
Engine D Engineering Large  > EUR 300m OEM Information Security 
Engine E Engineering Large  > EUR 500m Component 
Manufacturer 
Sustainability  
Engine F Engineering Small  > EUR 10m Smelter Tantalum Procurement 
Jewel A Jewelry Large  > EUR 80m OEM Diamond and Gold 
Purchasing 
Jewel B Jewelry Large  > EUR 5bn OEM Corporate Affairs 
Jewel C Jewelry Small  > EUR 10m Component 
Manufacturer 
CEO 
Jewel D Jewelry Medium  > EUR 200m Refinery Accreditations and 
Management Systems 
Jewel E Jewelry Large > EUR 20bn Refinery Commercial Director 
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Table 4: Implementation patterns and founding practices 
Implementation Pattern Practices 
 
Compliance “If the supplier does not cooperate at all and if it’s not a strategically important 
single supplier, we would stop working with him” (Engine D). 
 
“The companies we are working with are bigger and they know what they need 
to provide” (Jewel E). 
 
“Our suppliers have to admit to sustainability by central requirements in our 
general terms and conditions. Thus suppliers need to comply with this set of 
requirements as it covers a whole list of things from ethical sourcing to conflict 
minerals and it lays out the standards to environmental targets as well” (Auto D). 
 
“We change our contract-terms accordingly and thus demand suppliers to follow 
the Dodd-Frank Act. Also, we are working on a supplier code of conduct on that 
issue” (Aero A). 
Commitment „So what we did in the last years is to focus on awareness raising, explaining this 
topic, because a lot of suppliers did not know where Congo even is, like Chinese 
suppliers. They have never heard of that and the term conflict minerals. They 
don’t understand at all what we are asking them […] So we do a lot on education 
and awareness raising in this field” (Electro B). 
 
 “Two years ago we hosted an event in the US. We invited a large number of 
suppliers and made a speech on conflict minerals” (Electro C). 
 
“When we started the program we have organized the reviews for our suppliers 
and make them get an initial understanding of what the subject is, why we have 
to comply and why they need to do something. And with certain key suppliers, 
we had face to face meetings with our teams and their teams to discuss the 
approach we expect from them. Within the Netherlands area we have also set up 
some kind of roundtable process to align the reports within the group of peers 
here” (Engine A). 
Analytical “[Due diligence] is part of our quality audits of suppliers. Conflict minerals is a 
separate issue within them” (Electro E). 
 
“We check the International Material Data System which is a standardized system 
in the automotive industry for the chemical composition of all sourced products. 
Thus we are able to identify components that might contain conflict minerals. 
Knowing this, we then approach the suppliers and ask for a conflict-free proof” 
(Auto B). 
 
 “We first look at the type of product that is offered to us. Then we make an 
evaluation if it is a high risk or low risk product and on the other hand we look 
for the reason why the product is offered” (Jewel E). 
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Table 5: Implementation patterns of SCDD 
Implementation Pattern Compliance Commitment Analytical 
Aero A Auto A Aero D 
Aero B Electro B Auto B 
Aero C Electro C Auto C 
Auto D Engine A Auto F 
Auto E  Electro E 
Electro A  Engine F 
Electro D  Jewel A 
Electro F  Jewel D 
Engine B  Jewel E 
Engine C   
Engine D   
Engine E   
Jewel B   
 Jewel C   
 
Table 6: Stimulus for awareness on conflict minerals 
Stimulus Regulative Peer Pressure Competitive 
Aero A 
 
Electro C Aero C 
Aero B Engine B Aero D 
Auto B Engine C Auto A 
Auto D Jewel A Auto C 
Auto E Jewel C Electro B 
Auto F Jewel D Electro F 
Electro A  Engine F 
Electro D   
Electro E   
Engine A   
Engine D   
  Engine E   
Jewel B   
 Jewel E   
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Table 7: Stimulus implementation pattern link 
Implementation Pattern Compliance Commitment Analytical 
Stimulus    
Regulative Aero A Engine A Auto B 
Aero B - Auto F 
Auto D - Electro E 
Auto E - Jewel E 
Electro A - - 
 Electro D - - 
 Engine D - - 
 Engine E - - 
 Jewel B - - 
Peer Pressure Engine B Electro C Jewel A 
 Jewel C - Jewel D 
 Engine C - - 
Competitive Aero C Electro B Aero D 
 Electro F Auto A Auto A 
 - - Auto C 
 - - Engine F 
 
Table 8: Expected impact of SCDD 
Expected Impact Market  Relational Financial 
Aero A Engine A Aero B 
Aero D - Aero C 
Auto A - Auto C 
Auto B - Auto D 
 
Auto E - Electro C 
Auto F - Engine B 
 
Electro A - Engine C 
Electro B 
 
- Engine D 
Electro D - - 
Electro E - - 
Electro F - - 
 Engine E 
Aero A 
Auto A 
- - 
 Engine F  - - 
 Jewel A  - - 
 Jewel B 
 
- - 
 Jewel C - - 
 Jewel D - - 
 Jewel E   
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Table 9: Implementation pattern impact link 
Impact 
Market 
Performance Relational Assets 
Financial 
Performance 
Implementation Pattern    
Compliance Aero A - Aero B 
Auto E - Aero C 
Electro A - Auto D 
Electro D - Engine B  
Electro F - Engine C 
Engine E - Engine D 
 Jewel B - - 
 Jewel C - - 
Commitment Auto A Engine A Electro C 
 Electro B - - 
Analytical Aero D - Auto C 
 Auto B - - 
 Auto F - - 
 Electro E - - 
 Engine F - - 
 Jewel A - - 
 Jewel D - - 
 Jewel E - - 
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Table 10: Enablers of SCDD implementation 
Enabler Dimension 
 
External Tools and 
Support Systems 
“We use the tools and programs that have been developed by the CFSI including 
the conflict minerals reporting template and the resource of the conflict smelter 
audits […] We rely on the conflict smelters program for independent third party 
audits. We are not performing such audits ourselves - we rely on the reports of 
the CFSI program” (Electro B). 
 
 “We use the IMDS to track where conflict minerals may originate from. 
Applying the IMDS, we can track the specific materials which may contain 
conflict minerals and the responsible supplier” (Auto B). 
 
 “We have a license on business intelligence tools, to gather information. Well, at 
the moment we have developed internal tools but maybe in the future we ought 
to buy or develop new systems” (Jewel D). 
Internal Management 
Support 
“This is the mission of the company, in a clear statement from our board, from 
the CEO […] The key factor is the awareness of the people, and training of all 
people involved in the operations” (Jewel D). 
Power and Trust „How much pressure can our small firm apply? You may find a different answer 
at Apple or Intel. But we are a small OEM and we cannot exert sufficient pressure. 
[…] And even our suppliers are small firms incapable of passing on requirements 
and pressure upstream” (Engine D). 
 
“This is a topic which we only have indirect influence on […] the leverage is 
clearly in the upstream area. The only thing we can do is to decide whether to 
source conflict free or not. We are sitting in the passenger seat – we cannot drive 
a strict policy” (Electro A). 
 
 “It’s quite difficult to put pressure because we are putting a lot of pressure on the 
suppliers and sometimes we are putting too much pressure” (Auto E). 
 
“Our traders are our trade secret. Usually you don’t tell anybody who is your 
supplier. If I ask my supplier who is or please tell us where you buy things some 
of them do and some of them say no, that’s part of our secret. Like in gold you 
have a secret alloy” (Jewel C). 
 
“The IMDS database was accepted by the supplier on one condition: that we don’t 
have the right to use this information for negotiation purposes. So this is a huge 
effort coming from the suppliers to declare the natural content of the parts. So this 
database was implemented at the very beginning to make it possible to better track 
the rich materials” (Auto E). 
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Table 11: Barriers of SCDD implementation 
Barrier Dimension 
 
Gap in Regulation 
Framework 
“The biggest challenge is in the uncertainty about what is defined as ‘reasonable 
effort’. So that’s where the challenge would be - also in complying to these 
guidelines but also at later stage to show to externals that you indeed engage your 
supply chain with a reasonable effort in implementing this guidance” (Engine A). 
 
“The big challenge there is that the smelters don’t publish data on that. About 70 
percent - especially in Asia - are not in the direct scope of any European or 
American legislation and I think a key success factor would be to engage the 
smelters also in the mainly Asian countries and probably you would need the 
cooperation with the local governments there” (Electro B). 
 
 “The fundamental problem of supply chain due diligence is that regulators take 
a static supply chain for granted” (Auto A). 
Market Structure “We are very much depended on these components and then have a problem if 
these would suddenly be zero. I say there are a few suppliers that could be critical, 
we sometimes buy customer specific components but if we drop one of those 
suppliers it could be quite costly because we have to change the products” (Engine 
E). 
 
“There are currently too few certified smelters that would enable a firm of our 
size to source totally conflict-free” (Electro A). 
Complexity  “We are a downstream firm with highly complex products. Thus we do not have 
an analytical fingerprint of the origin of each mineral contained. […] There are 
still nine to eleven tiers between our direct suppliers and smelters. Mapping that 
would be an extremely costly Chinese whisper- like process” (Electro A). 
“But in components, we are far far far from the raw material and of course you 
know the inquiry is more complicated when more companies are involved” 
(Electro D). 
 
“It’s a complex system because we are a complex metal refiner and it would be 
much easier if there would be a primary smelter trading about 5 or 10 different 
concentrates from 5 or 10 different mines. You would have to assess 5 mines and 
it would be enough but we get materials from everywhere” (Jewel D). 
 
“You end up in other industries, such as metals, electronics, manufacturing, and 
again if you go through these industries you struggle to get to the level of smelters. 
This may be 6th or 7th tier, which is very far away to investigate at the moment 
especially in terms of the automotive industry its exceptionally close to the 
electronics industry” (Auto D). 
Resources and Costs “Extensive upstream-certification requires huge efforts and still would not be 
achievable due to missing mechanisms in the sourcing regions” (Electro A). 
 
“What we get depends very much on the staff of the supplier. Some are very poor, 
some are much more comprehensive” (Auto C). 
 
“To say it more drastically, most entrepreneurs in the jewels trade they have no 
higher education, they are craftsmen, they are designers. And when you confront 
them with the daily business and ask them to comply with these standards, they 
don’t have the professional background to do it and they don’t have the time” 
(Jewel C). 
 
„Actually we have to deal a lot with paperwork, which is necessary, at least some 
of them. But we are a small team, two people and you can imagine the 
administration has increased 10 times. … We are basically a small trading unit 
who is unable to do it themselves” (Aero D). 
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Figure 1: Social conflicts in mineral supply chains. Own illustration based on (OECD, 2013; RESOLVE, 2010)  
 
 
Figure 2: SCDD implementation based on Litz (1996) 
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53 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Implementation of SCDD in supply chains for conflict minerals 
 
 
